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John Nelson Rickard

T

he large-scale General Headquarters (GHQ)
exercise known as "Spartan," held in the
south of England during March 1943, was a
significant event in the history of the Canadian
Army in the Second World War. The purpose of
"Spartan" was to test the army in the dual tasks
of breaking out of an established bridgehead and
making the transition to open warfare. As a direct
result of shortcomings on the exercise, three
Canadian generals lost their commands. Of
greatest significance was the eventual relief of
General A.G.L. McNaughton as commander of
the First Canadian Army in November 1943. 1
During and after "Spartan" the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir
Francis Alan Brooke, and the Commander-inChief of Home Forces, General Sir Bernard Paget,
claimed that McNaughton's performance proved
his incapacity to lead First Canadian Army in
the field. In consequence, Brooke and Paget
orchestrated his removal and Canadian military
historians have generally supported their
assessment. However, the considerable criticism
directed at McNaughton resulting from "Spartan"
has suffered from oversimplification.2 This article
will review McNaughton's performance during the
exercise and assess its role in his relief.
"Spartan," involving ten-plus divisions, was
the largest field exercise held in Britain since
Exercise "Bumper" in September 1941. For the
exercise, most of southern England was divided
into three areas: "Eastland," with its capital at
Huntingdon, was a 'German' stronghold;
"Southland," with boundaries extending to the
outer defences of London (which was also under
'German' control), was theoretically recently
invaded by the Allies and served as the
established bridgehead from which Canadian

forces had to break out; "Westland" was neutral
territory and McNaughton was under strict
orders not to violate it (See Map 1).
The best t a n k country was along the
"Westland" border but contained barriers to
manoeuvre such as the Grand Union and Oxford
Canals and the Evenlode and Windrush Rivers.
In the east there were additional significant water
obstacles. The Thames River ran west out of
London and forked at Reading, continuing
northward while the westward extension turned
into the Kennet River. The southeast portion of
"Eastland" close on London was characterized
by additional canals and built-up areas known
as the Chiltern Hundreds. 3 Thus terrain had an
important role to play in the exercise.
Though not a major issue at the time, postwar
criticism by British and Canadian commentators
of McNaughton's performance began with his
selection of p a r t i c i p a t i n g u n i t s . As t h e
commander of the British "Second Army"
(facilitated by using the First Canadian Army
Headquarters in the field for the first time),
McNaughton was originally to command I
Canadian Corps and two British corps, one of
which was to be armoured. 4 This changed when
McNaughton substituted II Canadian Corps
Headquarters, newly created on 15 January, for
the British armoured corps. Second Canadian
Corps, however, was severely deficient in signals
equipment and had never conducted a staff
exercise or a tactical exercise without troops
(TEWT).
For John English, who has offered the only
in-depth analysis of McNaughton's role in the
exercise, the question of II Canadian Corps'
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inclusion came down to simple feasibility.
Without such fundamental preparation, he noted,
"the training value of the corps' participation [in
"Spartan"] was clearly questionable." 5 Yet in his
usually guarded form the Canadian official
historian, C.P. Stacey, suggested that the rarity
of s u c h large-scale exercises made it "an
opportunity not to be missed." Later in his
memoirs Stacey voiced a more candid opinion,
claiming that McNaughton's greatest mistake in
"Spartan" was in "committing to it at all the green
II Canadian Corps headquarters." 6 McNaughton,
and certainly Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar,
however, already had great confidence in the level
of training in I Canadian Corps7 and McNaughton
can hardly be blamed for trying to give II
Canadian Corps some realistic large-scale
training. Even Paget recognized the limited
opportunity for big exercises. 8
McNaughton's final order of battle therefore
included I Canadian Corps (2nd and 3rd
Canadian Infantry Divisions and 1 Canadian
Army Tank Brigade) commanded by Crerar, II
Canadian Corps (Guards Armoured and 5th
Canadian Armoured Divisions) commanded by
Lieutenant-General E.W. Sansom, and XII British
Corps (43rd and 53rd Infantry Divisions),
commanded by Lieutenant-General M.G.N.
Stopford. M c N a u g h t o n ' s o p p o n e n t was
Lieutenant-General J.H. Gammel, commanding
the "German Sixth Army" of only two corps: 8
Corps (9th and 42nd Armoured Divisions) and
11 Corps (49th and 61st Infantry Divisions).
McNaughton faced further post-war criticism
for concentrating his two armoured divisions in
II Canadian Corps to begin with, and then placing
them under Sansom who had no armoured
experience. 9 The q u e s t i o n of g r o u p i n g the
armoured divisions in one corps needs context.
Montgomery, who commanded the Southeastern
Army prior to leaving for the desert in August
1942, clearly had a powerful influence on
Canadian army doctrine. In June of that year he
drew attention to the lessons of Exercise "Tiger"
and declared that although a well-balanced corps
had two infantry divisions and one armoured
division, an army commander could, as the battle
progressed, "re-group his divisions, forming a
Corps of two, or even t h r e e , a r m o u r e d
divisions." 1 0 S u c h t h i n k i n g was easily
d i s s e m i n a t e d to the C a n a d i a n s b e c a u s e
Montgomery was still in England and spread his

teachings with messianic fervor. In fact, at El
Alamein in O c t o b e r - N o v e m b e r 1942,
Montgomery created his own Corps de Chasse,
X Corps, composed of 1st and 10th Armoured
Divisions. He was ultimately dissatisfied with the
results, announcing that "I do not agree with the
policy of keeping Armd. Divs. in separate
Corps."11 This observation was based on battle
experience not exercises. It s e e m s t h a t
Montgomery's desert armoured experiences were
not quickly disseminated, and may not have
gotten back to Home Forces prior to "Spartan."
McNaughton could have made I and II
Canadian Corps more balanced with one infantry
and one armoured division apiece, reducing his
number of corps from three to two. But Crerar
faced poor tank country in the centre and
Stopford's zone near London offered little better
prospect. In practice, Crerar failed to effectively
employ even 1st Army Tank Brigade to maintain
contact with enemy forces during the exercise.12
McNaughton's options regarding the placement
of the armoured divisions were thus limited by
the terrain. It made sense to concentrate them
on the left, where the ground offered better going,
and there is little evidence to indicate that they
would have been more effective elsewhere.
As for placing both armoured divisions under
the inexperienced Sansom, McNaughton really
had little choice in the matter. The question of
battle experience is one that h a u n t e d the
Canadian Army throughout the war and it is true
that Sansom knew little of armoured warfare.
Yet none of the senior Canadian officers,
i n c l u d i n g Crerar, h a d a n y e x p e r i e n c e
commanding armoured divisions in combat or
even on exercise. Giving II Canadian Corps to a
British officer with armoured experience was a
possibility, but, it is fairly safe to say, not in
McNaughton's eyes.
McNaughton's objective was to seize
Huntingdon as rapidly as possible and secure
and develop airfields, something he did not think
possible without first destroying the bulk of
Gammel's forces. McNaughton knew t h a t
Gammel's forces were divided into two main
groups and believed he could defeat each in detail
if he could manoeuvre between them with
Crerar's I Canadian Corps. This would also
prevent Gammel from concentrating against him.
25
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Cast of Characters
Clockwise from top left:
General Andrew McNaughton (left) and General Sir
Alan Brooke [far right) confer with aides during a
visit to Canadian troops in July 1940.
Major-General J.H. Roberts (second from left),
commander of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and
Lieutenant-General H.D.G.
Crerar(far right),
commander of I Canadian Corps meet during
Exercise "Spartan, "10 March 1943.
McNaughton (with binoculars) watches a tank battle
take place from a 2-pounder anti-tank gun position
during an exercise in May 1942.
General Sir Bernard Paget, General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief Home Force during a visit
to a Canadian HQ during "Spartan, " 9 March 1943.
Major-General E.W. Sansom (saluting) during a
marchpast by the British Columbia Dragoons, 12
March 1942. Sansom commanded II Canadian
Corps during "Spartan. "
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Moreover, XII British Corps could not be
concentrated until 48 hours after jumpoff (as per
exercise rules), and since Sansom's II Canadian
Corps was green, it made sense to lead off with
his most experienced corps. McNaughton decided
to advance straight on Huntingdon with Crerar's
corps and have Sansom's armoured corps
protect Crerar's left flank.
Paget suggested in his comments issued soon
after the exercise that the better course would
have been to conduct the main advance with I
and II Canadian Corps west of the Thames to
threaten Gammel's line of communications and
pry him out of successive positions, thereby
avoiding a direct assault across a serious water
obstacle. 13 This was exactly what Gammel
anticipated. His solution to being outnumbered
was to erect a strong pivot in the Chilterns and
swing back his right flank to the ThamesCherwell Rivers through Banbury and try to draw
the "British" armour into the open area on the
west covered by minefields and extensive
demolitions. Then he would concentrate and
counterattack McNaughton north of Banbury.
Gammel had little desire to seek decisive
armoured action until the situation was in his
favour.14 McNaughton's plan then was a sound
one and would have disrupted Gammel's
defensive dispositions.
The exercise c o m m e n c e d with GHQ
presenting both commanders an unexpected
situation to "test the flexibility" of their plans.
McNaughton had not envisioned advancing before
first light on 5 March, but GHQ allowed the
Germans to move first. Gammel quickly pushed
into "Southland" to gain much-needed depth and
time to effect extensive demolitions, especially
of bridges, well forward of his main position. It
does not a p p e a r t h a t McNaughton fully
appreciated the effects of such a development.15
At 0800 hours on 4 March, a day ahead of
schedule, McNaughton was ordered to begin his
advance as soon as possible. After speaking with
Crerar and Sansom, he fixed the time to move at
1200 hours that day. While Paget identified some
confusion in the early stages of this accelerated
movement, he stated that, "In view of the
difficulties the speed with which the advance
began was a most credible effort."16 In less than
five hours McNaughton had his corps' moving
and stuck to his original plan in the face of

Gammel's preemptive move, fearing that XII
British Corps could not be pushed northeast into
line if Crerar was held up. 17 Thus McNaughton
deserves some credit for achieving speed at the
outset and for taking the changed circumstances
in stride.
Throughout 4 March contact was made with
Gammel's center and left. By first light on the
5th Crerar had elements across the Thames at
Sonning, and the 5th Canadian Armoured
Division had crossed the Kennet River at
Hungerford by 0800 hours. At 1030 hours
Sansom was ordered to halt and occupy the
Swindon-Hungerford area even though enemy
forces had already withdrawn. McNaughton was
cautious with his armoured divisions in the early
stages, and Paget was rightly critical of him for
leaving II Canadian Corps to guard the army's
left flank throughout 6 and 7 March when the
two opposing armoured forces were 50 miles
apart. 18
At 0335 hours on 6 March McNaughton
concluded that he was being held up by light
forces and had yet to come to grips with the
enemy's main body. Gammel had pivoted as
intended on his left which produced severe
fighting there, but withdrew his center and right.
McNaughton decided to bring XII British Corps
into play to continue the attack in relief of I
Canadian Corps so Crerar could prepare for a
suspected armoured counterattack. 1 9 The
advance of XII British Corps succeeded in
breaking Gammel's pivot but enemy air action
and the slowness of Stopford's move allowed
Gammel to reform the pivot further back.
Apparently, McNaughton h a d trouble
deciding how best to proceed at this point. He
had a host of visitors in the morning of the 6th,
Air Marshals Sir Charles Portal and Sir Trafford
Leigh-Mallory at 1030 hours, and Sir Archibald
Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, at 1140 hours.
Most importantly, however, Paget and Sir James
Grigg, the Secretary of State for War, showed up
at 1245 hours. In a post war interview with
Marian C. Long, Arthur Bryant's research
assistant, Grigg recalled visiting McNaughton in
his operations room and being appalled at his
indecision. "Intelligence was coming in," Grigg
stated, "and McNaughton stood in front of his
situation map hesitating as to what to do and
what orders to issue." 20
27
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Grigg's assessment may or may not reflect
the reality of the situation, but McNaughton
certainly had a lot to think about. McNaughton
knew Gammel was trying to canalize the British
armour along the "Westland" border and he
wanted to keep the initiative by continuing to
force Gammel to withdraw in front of Crerar in
the centre. Moreover, sometime prior to 1630
hours, 6 March (perhaps at 1130 hours when he
was briefed by his GSO 1), McNaughton received
a captured operations order from the 49th
Infantry Division outlining its intention to
withdraw from the area Wallingford-Abingdon.
It also provided valuable intelligence on the future
moves of t h e 6 1 s t Infantry Division.
McNaughton's subsequent decision based on the
captured orders was the key factor in his eventual
relief from command of First Canadian Army.
At 1630 hours on 6 March McNaughton
cancelled the relief of I Canadian Corps by XII
British Corps and issued new instructions.
Sansom, who was visiting Army headquarters at
the time, was directed to move II Canadian Corps
to an assembly area east of the Thames and
prepare to move northeast to cut 11 Corps' lines
of communication. It appears that McNaughton
now intended to bring his armoured corps in
between Crerar and Stopford to pursue the
withdrawing enemy. To facilitate this new
movement across the Thames, McNaughton
directed that Class 40 bridges be built at
Wallingford, Shillington and Abingdon by the
afternoon of the 7th at the latest, less than 24
hours away.21
McNaughton's decision to move II Canadian
Corps east across the Thames was harshly
condemned at the time and subsequently because
it entailed moving the corps across the lines of
communication of I Canadian Corps at night.
Moreover, it also would have put all three of his
corps between Oxford and Reading on a frontage
of only 30 miles. GHQ indicated that Gammel
was retreating behind the Ouse River heading for
the Grand Union Canal as of 0045 hours, 7
March. As the exercise narrative stated, GHQ
deemed it "essential" that McNaughton "should
bring the enemy to battle with the maximum
British force before he reached the canal
position." 22 The quickest way to close on the
enemy was with an armoured advance, but
Sansom's corps was not in position to execute
McNaughton's strategy quickly.

At 0700 hours on the 7th McNaughton was
up analyzing the bridging problems confronting
the movement of Sansom's armour across the
Thames. By midday McNaughton considered the
situation unsatisfactory at Wallingford and
Abingdon although the Shillingford bridge was
nearly complete. Contrary to John Swettenham's
misinformed assertion, McNaughton did not then
rush off to the bridging sites. He never left
headquarters the entire day and his war diary
clearly proves this. 23 He did go forward the next
day at 1330 hours and returned to headquarters
by 2040 hours. Yet the assumption has long been
that McNaughton raced off to the bridging sites
on the 7th and stayed there all day micromanaging the efforts. On the contrary, on the 8th
he did spend a little more than an hour at
Pangbourne, Wallingford and Shillingford, but the
rest of the day was taken up in visits to airfields
and rear divisional headquarters. 24
Though McNaughton was not guilty of the
excessive micro-managing often ascribed to him
at this stage, his roaming at the front nevertheless
obviously bothered Paget who felt that the
tendency of commanders to go forward "must
be curbed." As Paget explained, "Commanders
on the higher levels can fight their battles only
from their HQ where they are fully in the picture
and have full signals facilities."25 One only has to
read of the numerous routine forward visits in
the diaries of Dempsey, Montgomery, Patton and
a host of other senior commanders at a variety
of levels to see that Paget's view was far too rigid.
During the battle of France Guderian moved
forward from XlXth Panzer Corps HQ and
personally intervened to hurry tanks across the
bridge at Gaulier on the outskirts of Sedan on
the Meuse River.26
At 0950 hours, 7 March McNaughton was
visited by Alanbrooke and General Sir Ronald
Adam, Adjutant General, for less than an hour.
Brooke's l o n g - s t a n d i n g a n x i e t y a b o u t
McNaughton's command ability was reinforced
by the morning visit. He noted in his diary at the
time that McNaughton was "quite incompetent
to command an army!" and "He does not know
how to begin to cope with the job and was tying
up his force into the most awful muddle." 27
Brooke was no doubt referring to McNaughton's
passing Sansom's corps through Crerar's.
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Top:
Canadian Engineers of
Canadian Corps work to assemble
a pontoon bridge across an English
river during Exercise "Spartan. "
Theoretically,
the permanent bridge
was "destroyed. "

I

Right:
One of numerous bridges
constructed during "Spartan" has
been finished allowing the advance
to continue.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss3/3

8

Rickard: McNaughton and Exercise “Spartan”

In fact, by 1200 hours, 7 March McNaughton
was rethinking this complicated move and
considered an advance - rather than a screening
operation - on the left with II Canadian Corps to
Banbury. Several reasons may have provoked this
re-evaluation. The "Spartan" narrative stated that
the difficulty of moving II Canadian Corps across
the rear of I Canadian Corps, and the risk of
concentrating both corps between Oxford and
Reading in a bottleneck with only four bridges,
were factors which influenced his thinking.28 But
if these were the reasons, it took McNaughton
almost 20 hours to act upon them. Moreover,
intelligence received at 1525 hours indicating that
Gammel had ceased his withdrawal to the canal,
no doubt reinforced his intention of pushing II
Canadian Corps west, and additionally of trying
now to effect a pincer movement with XII British
Corps. Stacey stated that the "circumstances in
which McNaughton changed his mind are not
recorded," 29 but Brooke may very well have
influenced the change during his visit through
disapproving body language, tone, or outright
suggestion of the difficulty of passing one corps
through another.

The concern with speed was a fair one, since
II Canadian Corps was now re-aligned for a move
east and had been preparing to do so for 24
hours. The result of the counter orders was that
in most cases units and lower formations started
the move west up to three hours late. At 1930
hours, 7 March, Guards Armoured Division
began a 48 mile move to its first concentration
area. By 0900 hours the next morning it arrived
and waited almost ten hours for 5th Canadian
Armoured Division to concentrate. The average
speed of advance by the armoured divisions was
a paltry five miles an hour. Stacey felt that the
lack of speed by II Canadian Corps, and in
particular 5th Canadian Armoured Division, was
not surprising due to the lack of signals
equipment and training of signals units. For 15
hours the Corps was out of direct wireless touch
with McNaughton's headquarters due to wireless
silence. Personnel handling new types of sets for
the first time did not help matters either.34 "It
should moreover be remembered," Stacey added,
"that this was the first occasion on which the
whole of the 5th Division was actually exercised
together as a formation."35

Whatever the circumstances, by 1605 hours
McNaughton made the decision to push XII
British Corps and I Canadian Corps north and
northeast and II Canadian Corps west (See Map
2). Paget s t a t e d t h a t this decision "was
undoubtedly the correct one" because the best
way to exploit superior forces was to stretch the
enemy's front.30 Warning orders went out at 1615
hours to Sansom and 1630 hours to Crerar and
Stopford. Detailed written orders were issued at
1740 hours. Apparently, Stopford was "reluctant
to make so sudden a move"31 because he was
not fully concentrated. McNaughton telephoned
him at 2110 hours and "impressed upon him
the necessity for determined advance." 32 In
pressing Stopford in this instance, and Sansom
in subsequent situations, McNaughton clearly
demonstrated that he possessed a measure of
driving power even if his grip was at times
questionable. Thus McNaughton was carrying out
the plan Gammel had originally anticipated but
Gammel's armour was no longer in position to
decisively counterattack Sansom's spearheads.
However, as the narrative stated, "It was
problematical whether II Canadian Corps could
advance with sufficient speed to gain the
advantage."33

The real problem, however, was traffic
control. Between 1530 hours and 1730 hours
on 8 March the administrative groups of Guards
Armoured Division were mixed up with the
fighting elements of 5th Canadian Armoured
Division. At 1900 hours Guards Armoured
moved on to its forward concentration area
southwest of Banbury without waiting for 5th
Armoured and arrived at 0600 hours 9 March.
Movement remained sluggish due to the
demolitions Gammel had prepared at the start
of the exercise and the continued traffic
problems. A major jam occurred throughout the
9th when II Canadian Corps' rear areas were
clogged with double lines of vehicles. 36 At 1800
hours McNaughton telephoned Sansom with
orders to press on quickly. At 2000 hours both
of Sansom's divisions had reached the Canal
north of Banbury and prepared to turn in on the
mass of Gammel's force.
By 1600 hours March 10 Sansom's armour
was finally in a position to threaten Gammel's
force and was replenished by 3rd line transport
at 1800 hours. Yet orders for a further advance
were cancelled at 1830 hours. 37 The narrative
does not state by whom but the logical suggestion
is Sansom not McNaughton, who was trying to

30
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urge II Canadian Corps forward instead of halting
it. After searching for Stopford on the 9th to
stress "the need for speed" from XII British
Corps, McNaughton tried to communicate with
Sansom from a No. 9 wireless set at 2330 hours
to stress the necessity to move forward "as fast
as humanly possible." It is not apparent that
contact was ever made; communications were
extremely poor.38
On 11 March McNaughton realized that the
pincer had failed and decided to have Sansom's
Corps advance northeast on the left of Crerar's.
In effecting this new assignment, Sansom took
the incredible step of stripping 5th Canadian
Armoured Division of its armoured brigade and
exchanged it for the Guards Armoured Division's
infantry brigade. Thus 5th Armoured, with
infantry only, was tasked to hunt tanks and
Guards Armoured, without infantry, was sent off
in an advance. Such radical re-grouping had been
severely criticized by Montgomery in previous
exercises. McNaughton, when he heard of this,
immediately did the right thing and sent off a
message to Sansom at 0950 hours March 11
o r d e r i n g h i m to " r e - e s t a b l i s h n o r m a l
organization armd divs forthwith."39 This was
impossible before 1800 hours and the result was
the near destruction of the Guards Armoured
armoured brigade, when, without infantry
support, it attacked carefully selected infantry
positions reinforced by substantial anti-tank
assets. 40 The next morning at 0900 hours ,12
March, GHQ announced the cease-fire.
A superficial examination of McNaughton's
performance on "Spartan" would suggest that he
had done moderately well because he was on the
verge of achieving his objective when the ceasefire sounded. Paget noted that after the 8th, "the
situation swung steadily in favour of the British
who had begun to overcome their handicap of
their lines of communication across the
T h a m e s . " 4 1 T h e r e is little g r o u n d s for
Swettenham's assertion that McNaughton
displayed "superior generalship" 4 2 but the
question remains: was McNaughton's
performance poor enough to warrant relief?
Any discussion of McNaughton's performance
must be considered in the context of Brooke's
obsession with military professionalism.
Brooke's first priority as CIGS was creating a
battle-worthy field army capable of taking on the

tactically advanced and b a t t l e - h a r d e n e d
Germans. He and Montgomery had been appalled
at the weaknesses in leadership of the BEF in
France in 1940 and the question of finding
s u i t a b l e c o m m a n d e r s stayed with t h e m
throughout the war. It cannot be overstated how
much the bitter experience of Dunkirk influenced
t h e m b o t h . After Exercise " B u m p e r " in
September 1941 Brooke knew the British Army
was unprofessional and therefore in serious
trouble. He noted in his diary that, "It is
lamentable how poor we are as regards Army
and Corps Commanders, we ought to remove
several of them, but heaven knows where we shall
find anything very much better."43
Brooke's credibility as a j u d g e of
commanders rested on more than his powerful
position as CIGS. Though commanding the
British II Corps in France in 1940 for only a short
time, historians have given him high marks for
the steady way in which he fought the retreat to
Dunkirk. France was his only battlefield
command during the war but nevertheless
Brooke's stature was immense and one gets the
impression of a very stable, fully modern mind
at work relentlessly dedicated to rebuilding the
British Army. Paget, on the other hand, never
commanded a large formation in the field and
pales beside the professionalism of Brooke.44
McNaughton's professionalism, then, is a
critical aspect of the "Spartan" manoeuvres. On
the surface McNaughton could boast the standard
credentials for high command. He attended the
Staff College at Camberley in 1921 and received
excellent evaluations. Major-General Hastings
Anderson wrote of McNaughton at that time that
he possessed a "wide general knowledge, and
brings a highly trained, scientific mind to bear
on all military problems." He also had a "good
knowledge of staff duties."45 In 1927 McNaughton
attended the Imperial Defence College to broaden
his outlook, another prerequisite to high
command. John English nonetheless suggests
that the general impression historians have
gained over the years is that McNaughton
"dabbled superficially in the military art." 46
Concerning "Spartan," English concluded that his
operational grip "reflected a lack of professional
knowledge that could have been acquired through
study."47

32
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Above, right 82, below left: Various scenes of
Churchill tanks from the Three Rivers Regiment
taking part in Exercise "Spartan," 8 March 1943
Below right: Two soldiers from Le Régiment de
Maisonneuve during "Spartan."
(Photos by Alexander M.
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It is evident from the testimony of a number
of individuals that McNaughton devoted excessive
amounts of time to the science side of war at the
expense of leadership and training. Brigadier
G.E. Beament, Brigadier, General Staff (BGS) of
First Canadian Army, stated that McNaughton
was too interested in weapons development,48 an
opinion definitely shared by Brooke. Months after
"Spartan" Paget told McNaughton personally that
he was "too much absorbed on the technical side
at the expense of training and command." 49
Brigadier N.E. Rodger, Guy Simonds' Chief of
Staff, echoed Paget's criticism after the war.50
Indeed, when Paget first visited McNaughton
during "Spartan" on 6 March he was treated to
an analysis of the Canadian high-velocity antitank gun and the 120 mm mortar. 51
Hastings Anderson noted in his 1921
assessment of McNaughton that he was perfectly
capable of functioning either in command or staff
duties "under conditions of modern war."52
Liddell Hart, who befriended McNaughton just
two years later, felt that during the Second World
War he was a soldier of "outstanding vision and
ability, who grasped the conditions of modern
warfare earlier and more fully than most others"53
However, McNaughton's grasp of armoured
warfare does not appear to have been sharply
honed by the time of "Spartan," even after four
years of wartime training in England.
Including the green II Canadian Corps in
"Spartan," and giving the inexperienced Sansom
command of both armoured divisions, hardly
worked to McNaughton's advantage, but these
decisions were not fatal sins. Nor do they suggest
that he did not know what he was doing.
Operationally, however, there were significant
problems. In his operations order for 6 March
he stated that "speed is essential.. .formations will
be handled boldly and widely, full advantage being
taken of possibilities of accelerating movement
and action against the enemy, by proceeding
across country."54 Yet remarkably, there were only
three armour versus armour actions during the
entire exercise, and two of those were initiated
by Gammel even though McNaughton was the
aggressor. Although McNaughton felt that in the
first two days the formations and units "have
been too deliberate in their procedure,"55 he never
utilized his armour aggressively until the last
days of the exercise and repeatedly lost contact
with the enemy's main body.

This c e r t a i n l y s u g g e s t e d c a u t i o n or
operational amateurism and Brooke clearly
would have looked d i s p a r a g i n g l y on
McNaughton's inability to bring the enemy
armour to battle. In commenting on Exercise
"Bumper" in 1941, Brooke, then C-in-C Home
Forces, stated that "The location and destruction
of these armoured forces must be the main
preoccupation of a commander, who must
therefore understand fully the handling of his own
armoured forces, which will be his main
instrument for destroying those of the enemy."56
There is little reason to suspect that he had
changed his mind in this regard and it is logical
to assume that the dexterous and effective
employment of armoured forces was a critical
criteria for him in judging success on "Spartan."
McNaughton's failure in the handling of the
armoured divisions thus probably stuck out
prominently in the mind of a man who had
thoroughly worked out his own thoughts on
armoured warfare.
McNaughton may have kept the weaknesses
in training of his armoured divisions and
Sansom's inexperience in mind when conducting
operations. Montgomery stated in his "Main
Lessons of the Battle" after El Alamein that
commanders had to conduct operations "in
keeping with the standard of training of his
troops." 57 But Montgomery took great pride in
knowing his commanders and units intimately
and thus was well positioned to make accurate
judgements on their abilities. This same quality
is not readily apparent in McNaughton because
he simply never gained a good reputation for
adequately training senior officers.58 In April
1941 Brooke attended a Canadian Corps
exercise. McNaughton was sick and his Chief-ofStaff, Miles C. Dempsey, showed Brooke around.
In his diary Brooke recorded: "Rather depressed
at the standard of training and efficiency of
Canadian Divisional and Brigade Commanders.
A great pity to see such excellent material as the
Canadian men controlled by such indifferent
commanders." 59
In the end, McNaughton's greatest mistake
during the exercise was not, as Stacey suggested,
including a green corps headquarters. His
greatest error was the decision to pass II
Canadian Corps through I Canadian Corps at
night. Liddell Hart watched "Spartan" personally
and commented after the war that "Unfortunately
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things went wrong in the early stages, a n d a b a d
traffic j a m occurred in getting 2 n d C a n a d i a n
Corps through the bottle-neck area around
Oxford." The principal fault, as he saw it, w a s
not with McNaughton b u t with "Some of his chief
s u b o r d i n a t e commanders." 6 0 There is no d o u b t
t h a t S a n s o m w a s unskilled in the h a n d l i n g of
a r m o u r e d divisions b u t t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t
McNaughton w a s ill-served by his subordinates
m i s s e s t h e essential point t h a t the decision to
shift t h e axis of II C a n a d i a n Corps w a s
McNaughton's alone.
Liddell H a r t a p p a r e n t l y s a w nothing wrong
with this type of manoeuvre in the first place b u t
Brooke obviously did. Brooke h a d b e e n highly
critical of t h e f u t u r e Field M a r s h a l Harold
Alexander for a laborious move of 2nd Canadian
Infantry Division in the rear of 2 5 t h Army T a n k
Brigade d u r i n g Exercise "Bumper," an action
which robbed Alexander of operational
flexibility. 61 Alexander survived "Bumper," b u t
Brooke never felt comfortable with his ability.
McNaughton's decision to p a s s II C a n a d i a n
Corps through I C a n a d i a n Corps was bad
enough, b u t h i s entire a p p r o a c h to operations
revealed more serious w e a k n e s s e s . Ordering
countermoves created uncertainty a n d interfered
with vehicle maintenance. For instance, at 1630
h o u r s on 6 March he ordered II Canadian Corps
e a s t a c r o s s the T h a m e s a n d a t 1615 h o u r s the
next day countermanded the order, directing the
corps west. As Table 1 indicates, even his basic
timings for normal operations the next day were
far too optimistic to ensure orderly execution and
u l t i m a t e s u c c e s s . Obviously, M c N a u g h t o n
visualized w h a t he wanted to do operationally in
very s h o r t timeframes, a b a d trait for an a r m y
commander. As Paget correctly s t a t e d in his
comments, "Corps cannot be swung about on the
battlefield like battalions a n d should be given at
least 24 hours' warning." 62 In reality, they should
be given even more time.
Intimately connected with McNaughton's illconceived timings w a s a serious problem with
bridging. "Plans for bridging," Paget noted, "never
caught up with the operations a n d were never
more t h a n one day ahead of the advance." 6 3 The
problem was simply that McNaughton never fully
g r a s p e d t h e effect of G a m m e l ' s d a s h i n t o
"Southland" a n d never recovered from this initial
failure. Some 60 bridges were c o n s t r u c t e d by

McNaughton's a r m y during "Spartan" of which
only half were u s e d . As the Chief Engineer of
Home Forces noted,
By far the greater part of the delay imposed on
the British advance was accounted for by the
time taken to deploy resources. In an advance a
CRE [Commander Royal Engineers] must be
planning for tomorrow; he must be able to look
ahead 48 hours. The CE [Chief Engineer] of a
Corps must be able to look ahead 3 days. The
CE of an Army must be able to look ahead 4
days at least. There must be a plan.64
Paget felt t h a t the r e p e a t e d traffic j a m s were
avoidable since "ample roads in both army areas
a n d the density of movement w a s comparatively
light" b u t "no army traffic plan was formulated." 65
T h u s congestion a n d its corresponding negative
effects on operations were inevitable.
There is some evidence that McNaughton was
never keenly interested in fully developing the
capacity of the Army h e a d q u a r t e r s to function
smoothly in the field. When s u c h a t t e m p t s were
m a d e on previous exercises, Brigadier B e a m e n t
declared that McNaughton paid s u c h efforts mere
lip service. 6 6 Moreover, Guy S i m o n d s , t h e m o s t
professional soldier Canada produced during the
war, d e c l a r e d u p o n e v a l u a t i n g t h e v a r i o u s
"Spartan" reports that, "the main conclusions [of
the C-in-C Home Forces] indicating w e a k n e s s e s
35
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Top left: English tankers surrender to soldiers from
3 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA during Exercise
"Spartan."
Bottom, left: An "enemy" tank crew is captured by
an armoured car crew from 7th Recce Regiment.

British commanders had to go as well for the
s a k e of c o m b a t efficiency, a fact which
undermines the suggestion that McNaughton was
relieved because he was Canadian. 70

in o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d training...[were]
substantiated by events during the exercise."67
Thus, after three and a half years of training in
England, McNaughton's skill in directing an army
was simply not up to standard.
Brooke h a d b e e n c o n c e r n e d with
McNaughton's leadership since 1941. In his
"Notes for My Memoirs," Brooke wrote that "The
more I saw of the Canadian Corps at that time
the more convinced I became that Andy
McNaughton had not got the required qualities
of command. He did not know his subordinate
commanders properly and was lacking in tactical
outlook. It stood out clearly that he would have
to be relieved of his command." 68 Brooke felt
strong enough about McNaughton's professional
weaknesses to declare that, "I felt that I could
not accept the responsibility of allowing the
Canadian Army to go into action under his
orders." 69 Brooke also recognized that several

The irony of t h e s i t u a t i o n is t h a t
McNaughton's replacement in command of First
Canadian Army, Harry Crerar, had no battle
experience either. His selection shows the dearth
of high-ranking Canadian officers in place to
assume important commands. Indeed, only Guy
Simonds went through the logical sequence of
commanding a division in combat in preparation
for c o m m a n d i n g a corps in combat and
subsequently briefly commanding First Canadian
Army. However, Brooke was genuinely more
impressed with Crerar's professionalism than
McNaughton's. During "Spartan" Brooke also
visited Crerar and I Canadian Corps and noted
that he had put on "a real good show" and had
"improved that Corps out of all recognition." 71
Even Montgomery, no fan of Crerar's in
Normandy, noted of a mid-1942 exercise that the
"Canadians did splendidly, and were well
commanded by Crerar."72
McNaughton knew that "Spartan" was designed
to assess the physical endurance of the troops
and their proficiency in tactics, but he also
characterized it as "a strict test...of the ability of
commanders and staffs to administer, handle and
fight their formations and units." 7 3 Stacey
suggested that McNaughton probably never even
c o n s i d e r e d "the possibility t h a t a poor
performance by the army might reflect on
himself" 74 b u t t h i s s e e m s u n r e a l i s t i c .
McNaughton did not have to exhibit Napoleonic
brilliance but a solid performance would have
gone a long way to solidifying his position as
commander of First Canadian Army. His lack of
professionalism was readily apparent during the
exercise, however, and the entire episode must
be placed within the context of Brooke's earnest
desire to prepare the army for the return to the
continent of Europe.
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